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54 Taylor, op. cit., p. 179. In a different context, Vitali
dismisses Taylor's claim by pointing out that animals practice
deception, too (p. 74, note 9). However, it does not follow
from this that moral agents should do the same, particularly
when they do it for pleasure rather than necessity. Causey
also discusses Taylor on the deception issue, misinterpreting
him by implying that this is his sole reason for rejecting sport
hunting. According to Causey, Taylor would have to hold
that the bow hunter who cleanly kills an animal after a
necessarily deceptive stalk, afterwards making "full,
nonfrivolous" use of the body, behaves more morally
objectionably than the safari "hunter" who runs down the
terrified prey in a Land Rover, shoots it with a semi-automatic
weapon, and leaves the body to rot (except for the head).
(Causey, op. cit., p. 340.) Taylor is committed to no such
implication. His "duty of fidelity" (nondeception) to nature
is only one of the duties he believes moral agents have to the
wild. The overriding duty we have to wild creatures, he holds,
is respectful treatment. Taylor objects to sport hunting on the
grounds that it shows a lack ofrespect to that which we ought
to respect ([aylor, pp. 274-276), not just on the grounds that
it is deceptive. Obviously, the Land Rover hunter who uses
heads for interior decoration shows less respect for wild
creatures than Causey's highly idealized bow hunter. (Actual
bow hunters don't measure up as well. In Texas, only half of
all deer hit by arrows are retrieved by bow hunters. The rate
of crippling and septic infection among umecovered deer is
high. Deer who are retrieved slowly bleed to death, apparently
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Integral to the defenses of hunting offered by
Causey and Vitali is the claim that human beings are
instinctive killers. Pluhar rightly disputes this claim
on two grounds.
(1) It is by no means clear that human beings have a
basic urge to hunt and kill or that killing animals
is an essential human trait, in that a number of
human beings, indeed a majority, lack the urge.
And as she correctly points out, the paleolithic
humans who doubtless took pleasure in cooking
and eating animals they had hunted may well
have done so because they were hungry; there is
no compelling reason to assume that their
pleasure came from the act of killing itself.
Further, ex-hunters generally do not claim that
they have learned to control a tremendous urge
to hunt, whereas previously they were victims
of akrasia, but rather that they have had a gutlevel transformation such that they no longer
even have the urge to hunt.
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(2) It is by no means clear that even if there were a
basic human atavistic urge that it would
automatically be permissible to hunt animals;
likewise, the basic sexual urge in human beings,
assuming for the moment that such an urge is
basic, does not give a carte blanche to the rapist
or child molester.
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The purpose of my response to Pluhar's paper is to
reinforce these two criticisms of Causey and Vitali, a

"The Joy of Killing" was written during spring,
1990, when I was freed from teaching dUlies by
my appointment as the 1990 Pennsylvania State
University "Helena Rubinstein Endowed Fellow
in the Humanities."
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procedure which will force me to leave aside much in
these two articles which deserves criticism, as in
Causey's canard that animal rightists usually defend
their case by an appeal to emotion rather than to reason
(as if Regan, Singer, Clark, Sapontzis, Jamieson, et al.,
never existed), or as in Vitali's assumption that by
showing (if, in fact, he can show this) that only human
beings are rational he can avoid the argument "from
marginal cases" without also showing that all human
beings are rational. My attempt to reinforce Pluhar's
criticisms will rely explicitly on certain sociobiological
considerations which, it seems, are implicit in Pluhar's
paper. That is, I intend my remarks to be friendly
amendments to Pluhar's paper. My hope is that this
brief, hence inadequate, foray into sociobiology will
both combat the standard right-wing appropriation of
sociobiology (an appropriation which is often used to
defend hunting) and avoid the standard left-wing fear
that by taking sociobiology seriously we are admitting
the nonmalleability of human nature and society.
First, do human beings have a basic urge to kill? It is
worth noting that gorillas and chimpanzees are, for the
most part, plant-eaters, although chimpanzees will also
eat small animals. Causey's and Vitali's fantasies about
"The Human Hunter" should be corrected not only by
the evidence from our primate ancestors but also by the
reminder that even modem human hunter-gatherers get
almost all of their food from plants (although eggs and
small animals may also be gathered) and certainly eat
nothing like the amount of flesh consumed in the West.
We know very little about what our hominid ancestors
ate, but the best guess is that as good a case can be made
for their being grain-eaters as that they were predators. It
is convenient, to say the least, for Causey and Vitali to
see a brutal vitality just below the skin of (male) human
beings, but there is no evidence provided in their articles
to move the anti-hunter away from his view of human
beings as calmer, more companionable, and less
committed to a grossly predatory way of life than that
which the hunter defends. l
Ethological evidence regarding violence among
conspecifics can help to point out Causey's and Vitali's
hyperbole. A fight between two wolves can end abruptly
if the loser submits; the victor will snarl above the exposed
neck of the other, but he will not bite, since his desire to
seize the other is "inhibited." This is the type of example
which readily suggests itself as an analogue for moral
conscience. By way of contrast, doves react to defeat by
fleeing; if the loser cannot flee, the victor is not inhibited
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from pecking him to death. In Causey's and Vitali's
positions human beings inhabit the worst of two worlds:
they are, like the doves, not inhibited from killing (in the
human case, from killing members ofother species), and
their capabilities to kill have been vastly increased through
weaponry. Although it is not impossible for a human
being to kill a conspecific with his bare hands ( and this
not because we have sharp teeth or claws, but because
human beings have bodies that are somewhat vulnerable),
it is very difficult to do so; murder most likely began
with the invention of clubs. And it is even more difficult
to kill game animals with one's bare hands than it is to
kill our conspecifics. 2
More fruitful than the effort to trace hunting back
to the seething, paleolithic "beast" within us is the
effort to understand it as part of a culture which has a
fetish for guns, a fetish the continued existence of
which is assured by frankly reactionary organizations
like the NRA. Hence there is something disingenuous
in Causey's and Vitali's indignation at the close
association some see in the terms "hunter" and
"redneck." Animals are generally more inhibited about
killing conspecifics than about killing outside their
species, but even when this fact is considered it only
becomes likely that nonhuman animals will be hunted
by human beings if human beings stipulate a right to
own guns in order to do so.
lt is is incumbent on the anti-hunter who denies a
basic urge to kill to explain the continued appeal of
hunting, albeit to a minority of the population. I am
proposing two reasons: first, in America, at least, there
is a strong historical and cultural fascination with
weapons, a fascination which is a historical and
cultural contingency rather than a biological necessity;
and second, there is a noticeable ease with which
human beings can objectify those who are not familiar.
People generally, I suggest, do not wish to hunt or kill
their fellows. Look around the room. But our nonnal
humanity can be turned off if we are convinced we
are dealing with heretics or savages or gooks or, in
the present case, with nonrational beasts. This is where
Causey's and Vitali's avoidance of, or refusal to deal
with, the argument from marginal cases is a bit too
convenient. When this argument is considered
carefully it becomes much harder not to notice our
familiarity with our fellow animals. I have said that
people "generally" do not want to hunt or kill their
fellows, which leaves open the possibility that there
are some sociopathological cases which do, in fact,
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fit Causey's and Vitali's description, just as the
Harlows' motherless, raped monkeys treated their
infants as they would have treated rats. The sadness is
that otherwise moral people like Causey and Vitali (by
the way, I have known and liked Vitali for 15 years)
have unwittingly delivered an apologia for these
monstrous mammals reared without love. 3

but neither Causey nor Vitali are trying to defend
subsistence hunting.
Thus far I have attempted to support Pluhar's
position that Causey and Vitali do not have sufficient
evidence to claim that human beings have a natural
desire to kill. I would also like to support her claim
that the mere existence of the desire to kill would not
in itself establish the case for the morality of hunting.
All morality involves some ascetical principle, not in
the pejorative sense of self-denial, but in the original
sense of askesis as the (athletic) training of desire. In
virtue-based ethics the exercise of the desire to kill, if
such a desire existed, would have to compete with
other desires in the attainment of eudaemonia; in
utilitari-anism it would have to be demonstrated that
the exercise of such a desire was conducive to the
maximization ofpleasure and the minimization of pain
for sentient beings in general in that some desires must
give way to others in order to do justice to the
utilitarian calculus; and in deontology one may act on
a desire only if one does not infringe on the rights of
others. Causey says nothing very convincing here,
apparently because she thinks that the mere existence
of the desire to kill is self-authenticating. Vitali, as
Pluhar notes, does try morally to justify hunting, but
his section on the denial of animal "rights," the weakest
section in his article, does not show sufficient familiarity
with the details of the arguments of animal-rightists who
are philosophers.
Causey, at least, if not Vitali, seems to be led to the
assumption that the existence of an urge to kill in
humans guarantees the morality of hunting because of
the supposed pragmatic necessity of the urge: without
it human beings would not have survived. But the
matter is a bit more complicated than this. Even if one
accepts the position of the sociobiologists that human
morality is at least somewhat connected with those
biological predispositions which are conducive to
survival, it is not necessarily the case that the defenders
of hunting have a lock on this position. Moral concern
for other species can be traced back to natural
sentiments, as in the fact that people who cared for their
domesticated animals tended to leave more descendants
than those who used them carelessly,4 just as among
nonhuman animals the dominant members of the species
were most often those who allowed their subordinates
lives of their own, and who sometimes even assisted
them, because to press home one's attack often causes
"the courage of despair" in one's victim which causes

Ethological suggestions that "aggression" has an
instinctual root have been given a bad press by
interpreters like Causey and Vitali. Ethologists have
been interpreted as saying (and some of them may think
that they are saying) that war or murder or hunting are
unavoidable and that it would be unnatural (and perhaps
dangerous) to outlaw hunting. But in ethological jargon
"aggression" refers to any display or threat or carefully
inhibited contest. The aggressive impulse is very often
no more than the impulse to "make a good show before
one's fellows" or to "try one's weight." These contests
do not, for the most part, employ the animal's most
dangerous skills. The point of these displays-from
the musical displays of birds to the squabbles among
tom cats to match the preferences of females-is not
so much to maim, much less to kill, one's rival as to
establish the details of one's own life within a social
context. A predator hunting to survive is another matter,
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the dominant member to pay a greater price than he
would want to payor could pay.s
I would like to conclude by making it clear that in
this response I have not tried to defend in general the
use of sociobiological principles to solve philosophical
problems, a task which would require a great deal more
effort than I have expended. Rather, I have tried to
show that ifit is legitimate to introduce sociobiological
considerations into philosophical disputes, in this case
into the dispute regarding the morality of hunting,6 then
we should not assume that such considerations
necessarily support the hunter's case. That is, antihunters should resist the claim that justice and mercy
are free-floating cultural artifacts which are not rooted
in natural inclination.
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